

Summary of Mr. Ian Martin, *Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in East Timor, Nepal, and Libya*

At the Seminar on Inclusivity in Rebuilding States: Focusing on Inclusivity in Security Sector Reform, co-hosted by Japan, Tanzania, and Slovakia mission to the UN on April 22, 2014

Initial Presentation (Main Speech of the Seminar)

Mr. Martin began by agreeing with the importance of inclusivity which the Secretary-General report on post-conflict peacebuilding emphasizes. He also agrees with the emphasis on such key elements like national ownership and a tailor-made mandate for each mission.

In the body of his speech, Mr. Martin gave highlights from his three assignments that he says emphasize three important lessons.

1. The centrality of the security sector in peacebuilding.
2. The security sector reform is more a political process than a technical one.
3. While the process demands inclusivity, there are hurdles putting inclusivity into practice.

Mr. Martin first discussed the lessons learned from his time as UN Special Envoy in Timor-Leste in 2006. When he was sent there in May 2006, the country was in a crisis which created more than 100,000 internal displaced people (IDP). The security sector had imploded, with police fighting police and military fighting military, and police and military also fighting. The UN mission in East Timor (UNTAET) that was established in 1999 was perceived as successful before the crisis in 2006 happened. In retrospect, it seems that UNTAET lacked successfully integrated approaches for SSR; it was also true that the International Community had a strong focus on establishing police, but less on creating a credible national army. Mr. Martin's role in the aftermath of the crisis was to analyze the situation in Timor-Leste, and to report to the UN Security Council about what the Council should do. He recommended the mandate with holistic approach for SSR, and these recommendations were reflected in the SSR support unit which covered both police and military in UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) that was established in 2006, although the unit was slow to be staffed. If we review the SSR after 2006, it is fair to say that the government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT succeeded in creating national dialogue for SSR in which ordinary people also participated. The unique experience in Timor-Leste regarding SSR can offer useful lessons for the future.

With regard to Nepal, Mr. Martin emphasized that the mandate of the UN was extremely limited, compared with the UN missions in Timor-Leste which had very expansive mandates. Working with an extremely limited mandate, the UN was restricted to monitoring "the management of arms and armies". Coming out of a civil war, each party to the peace agreement had very different versions of what the new army should look like. The UN was left in the uncomfortable position of monitoring cantonments of former combatants while the parties failed to create a national consensus about the integration of former Maoist combatants into the post-conflict army. The delay of SSR has been one of the main factors which delayed the peace process in Nepal. The delayed integration or reintegration into civilian life of former Maoist army combatants has led to bitterness and disillusionment about SSR process among them today. Mr. Martin emphasized that it is critical to have national dialogue in Nepal on SSR so that people can have consensus about what police and military they actually would like to possess.

Finally, Mr. Martin's explained his experience in Libya where SSR was a central challenge in state-building after Qaddafi regime was collapsed. He noted that Qaddafi regime deliberately kept the national army weak so that he controlled the country by special brigades which were loyal to him. The police force was fairly intact, but it was never a robust force. Then, there was a multitude of militias across the country, including 1) revolutionary brigades, 2) various militias which were created to fill the power vacuums in local communities, and 3) groups which emerged after the conflict which were almost criminal gangs. Thus, it was clear that SSR is one of the most serious challenges in rebuilding Libya. However, he asserted, that the role expected of the UN in advancing SSR in Libya, especially in building national armed forces, had initially not been clear. Eventually, the UN had presented comprehensive plans on SSR, including coordination structures to address DDR, management of weapons and munitions, police development, reform of the national army, and overall security sector structures. However, while the national ownership is critical in SSR, the extreme weak leadership of the decision-making system in Libya made the UN efforts very difficult. Mr. Martin called for a national, inclusive dialogue as a basis of creating a comprehensive SSR process in Libya.

In the end, Mr. Martin stressed that the security sector is essential to rebuilding states. The SSR should be the heart of the integrated political mandate of the UN missions. The SSR should be inclusive and holistic, including all political actors and civil society, aligning with the national dialogue. The delays of SSR could result in delaying entire peace and state-building process as seen in Nepal and Libya. Additionally, SSR is not a technical process, and it cannot be separated from the overall political process of rebuilding states. In order to succeed, there must be dedicated funds and personnel. Political leadership by both national authorities and the UN are key to making a difference.

Key Comments in the Discussion Section

In response to the question about how long the UN can or should wait for creating inclusive process in reforming the security sector, Ian Martin argued that it is a political reality that it takes a long time to advance SSR in an inclusive manner; there is a serious dilemma between the need to stand up police and military in a speedy manner in post-conflict states and the need to make the process inclusive. He emphasized that it is important to recognize this dilemma and to keep making efforts to conduct SSR with special attention to inclusivity, assessing the security situation on the ground carefully.

In response to another question about whether or not it is appropriate to include former combatants who had committed war crimes or other atrocities, Mr. Martin said that ideally, the security sector reform process would include proper vetting to exclude perpetrators of serious war crimes from the new system. It is important to have the linkage between transitional justice and SSR.

In his concluding remarks, Martin presented his comments about the significance of this type of the seminar. He argued that there is substantial value of the seminar which can bring the various experiences on the ground to develop doctrines which could be used in UN Headquarters which could disperse the doctrine to the ground. He emphasized that this seminar reinforced the doctrine of the inclusivity in SSR, but also illuminated the difficulty and wisdom required to

realize inclusivity in SSR. The fact that the result of the seminar will be reported by the hosting states to the UN Security Council Open Debate which would take place on 28 April 2014 was also significant, he concluded.